

## EDITORIALS

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### The Carpet Bags of Saigon

No doubt some kind of simulated cease-fire will be patched up in Vietnam, and probably before the end of the year; failure to achieve anything would be too embarrassing for the Administration. It will be a military stand-still without a political foundation or, in proper bureaucratic, infrastructure. So it is quite natural that in an adaptation of Clausewitz's famous saying, it will be war carried on by other means. A recent report from Saigon by George McArthur, headlined in the *Los Angeles Times*: "Vietnam Future: U. S. Planners Thinking Big," gives a printout of the future.

McArthur leads off his dispatch with the not very surprising news that, while the negotiations proceed by fits and starts in Paris, U. S. bureaucrats in Saigon "are confidently using the time to blue-print empires in South Vietnam." Some of them have acquired villas there; they find the climate congenial, and would like to stay on, enjoying the good life to which they have grown accustomed. It is impossible to get any accurate estimate of how many U. S. civilians are hanging out in South Vietnam with some kind of official connection with the American Embassy, or the armed forces, or intelligence, or whatever else in the way of "programs" may be under way. And if that is impossible, how can anyone estimate what number of bodies will be required to carry on a simulated peace? The only thing certain is that proliferation is under way; the bureaucrats are "thinking big." "No single person or headquarters," writes McArthur, "seems to be running the show. Things are just growing, strangely enough, in a somewhat microscopic replay of the great buildup of 1965." Of course, microscopic can turn into macroscopic. The planners, at first stunned by Kissinger's forecast that "peace" was close at hand, are regaining their vigor and redoubling their efforts. They intend to stay on.

Clothes may not make the man, but they can make him look different, and by all indications such transformations will be taking place on a large scale. It takes only a few minutes and some pieces of paper to change a colonel in uniform into a civilian bureaucrat in colorful sport shirt and slacks. Or he may be nominally a civilian already, a Central Intelligence Agency type, striving to win the hearts and minds of the people. In addition to CIA, AID, CORDS and other organizations whose full names are rarely used, the United States now has four consulates in South Vietnam. McArthur predicts that these peace-loving offices, complete with military attachés, State Department political officers, CIA operatives, et al., will be installed permanently at Can Tho, Nha Trang, Bien Hoa and Da Nang—"by coincidence" the present locations of headquarters for the four Army corps of the million-man South Vietnamese Army. Four consulates may be thought a reasonable number, since in France, with 50 million Frenchmen and hordes of U.S. tourists, we have five consulates in all.

There is also a legal side to this orgy of preparation for "peace": it centers in Washington. Having had practically nothing to say about the start of the war, Con-

gress may want to be in at the finish. Constitutionally, this is no simple matter. Since we do not recognize North Vietnam, except for the purposes of killing and bombing, an agreement with Hanoi would not be a treaty and the Senate would have nothing to say about it. But we do recognize South Vietnam, so if they sign, wouldn't that constitute a treaty? Some lawyers think so, but it is a safe bet that President Nixon will not. As Commander in Chief he can order a cease-fire at his pleasure.

Sen. J. William Fulbright thinks an agreement to end the war should be submitted to the Senate for its scrutiny. But the Senate wants a cease-fire and will doubtless be reluctant to appear to be meddling in the interminable negotiations. All the same, the time will come when the Senate must insist on a say. "I would assume," Senator Fulbright observes, "any agreement would involve obligations to spend several billions of dollars, a commitment that should be submitted to the Congress." And further, "with these secret agreements, we find so often that they have obligations on our treasury or to send troops abroad, so it seems only fair that Congress have a chance to examine them." If Congress hopes to maintain some degree of control over what happens in Vietnam after a cease-fire, it should note what is happening there now. The bureaucrats are "thinking big" and will no doubt set programs in motion without initial Congressional approval, and then, as in the past, gamble that they can induce the Senate and House to continue and even expand them. So the time for vigilance is now.

LOS ANGELES TIMES  
29 NOV 1972

# Vietnam Future: U.S. Planners Thinking Big

Civilian Advisers Rising;  
Bureaucrats See Country  
Taking on American Tone

BY GEORGE McARTHUR  
Times Staff Writer

SAIGON—While cease-fire negotiations proceed with questionable progress in Paris and elsewhere, the U.S. bureaucrats of Saigon are confidently using the time to blueprint future empires in South Vietnam.

As of now, their vision is unsettling.

Although past American experiences in Laos and Cambodia can hardly be called successful, the planners are casually using those countries as partial models for the Vietnam blueprints.

President Nixon's senior wordsmith, Herbert G. Klein, has denied plans to station "either civilian or military advisers" with South Vietnam's army after a cease-fire. He was treading a semantic tightrope, according to all the evidence in Vietnam itself.

The American military population has at least temporarily levelled off at about 27,000 men. But the overall U.S. presence in South Vietnam once gain has started to slowly grow. Civilian technicians have arrived in significant numbers and civilian contractors are stepping up operations in dozens of areas like training, maintenance and supply.

## Impossible to Get Estimate

At this moment it is impossible to get an accurate estimate of the number of U.S. civilians in South Vietnam with some kind of official connection with the U.S. Embassy, military, intelligence or others.

No single person or headquarters seems to be running the show. Things are just growing, strangely enough, in a somewhat microscopic replay of the great buildup of 1965. No one seems to expect this civilian

minibulldup to get out of hand. But nobody has yet said "stop."

Part of the problem is that Washington has not stepped in to provide answers to some specific bureaucratic questions.

With Saigon's military warehouses bulging with liquor, PX goods and other supplies for some 30,000 men, the supply officials naturally want to know "how long?" and, more supplies are en route by ship already.

## Planners Regain Vigor

Meanwhile, the planners, who were stunned by the mid-October revelation that a cease-fire was near, have regained their vigor. Having been frozen out of earlier planning by the secrecy of the talks, they are redoubling their efforts.

"Plans are proliferating prodigiously," admitted one staff colonel, who retained a sense of humor and perspective despite a tiring and unending round of committee meetings.

The plans, partial plans, contingency plans and perhaps some wishful dreaming on paper now provide for a South Vietnam with a pronounced American governmental cast. While many of the new experts or technicians (or advisers) will be wearing civilian sportshirts, the suspicion is strong that underneath they will have dogtags, or at least retirement papers. And, the civilians already here, including many

Central Intelligence Agency types, will simply change titles and continue what they are doing, and possibly do more.

One staff officer, already sporting civilian clothes much of the time, admits that the biggest change in his office will be the removal of some awards and military knickknacks, including a mounted enemy AK-47 rifle, which would not fit his "new" identity.

He also admits that he could get different orders tomorrow, and he halfway expects them.

"To tell you the truth," one colonel admitted, "nobody can make flat statements around here."

The new plans seem in some measure to be an outgrowth of this military insecurity.

"When in doubt plan for everything," joked an enlisted clerk soon to depart Vietnam.

In the initial days following Washington's announcement that it had agreed to a 60-day evacuation period following a cease-fire, the U.S. command was mainly concerned with the crash program to bring in aircraft, guns and priority military equipment.

## Planning Activities

As the negotiations became more and more extended, so did the planning activities at the U.S. Embassy and MACV — Military Assistance Command Vietnam. Recommendations began to load the coded radio circuits back to Washington.

In more or less finished form, a dozen or more major plans now exist.

The first is a troop withdrawal schedule, with evacuation starting the day after a cease-fire is signed and extending until about D-plus-57, when the last evacuation flight will depart Tan Son Nhut Airport (probably to be followed on the runway by a jet landing with mail for the U.S. military attache's office).

Other plans cover setting up various military attache offices and specifying the troop numbers needed, the setting up of finance teams (as required by U.S. law) to check on

Vietnamese use of military equipment, provisions to provide military information to international supervisory teams and a new cloak for an agency known as CORDS—Civil Operations and Rural Development Support.

The CORDS agency is a scheduled casualty since it is now largely manned by military officers and is directly under the U.S. military command. As the chief "civilian" agency for pacification, CORDS always has included many young State Department officers, although it has been directed by either a CIA man or a retired military officer.

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# U.S. to Keep Many Civilians in Vietnam

By FOX BUTTERFIELD

Special to The New York Times

SAIGON, South Vietnam,

Nov. 25—Even as the United States military is packing up for its expected exit from Vietnam, American officials here are secretly planning a major postwar presence of United States civilians in Vietnam, with many of them doing jobs formerly done by the military.

About 10,000 American civilian advisers and technicians, most of them under Defense Department contract, will stay on in South Vietnam after a cease-fire according to well-informed sources. Three civilians will do everything from running the South Vietnamese military's personnel and logistics computers to teaching the Vietnamese Air Force how to fly and maintain newly provided planes and repairing the complex military communications network left behind by the United States Army.

About half of these civilian workers are already in Vietnam, with others beginning to arrive almost daily at Saigon's Tan Son Nhut Airport under new contracts signed confidentially in the last few weeks.

Senior American officials insist that such a continued American presence following a cease-fire period would violate "neither the letter nor the spirit of the peace settlement," as one diplomat said today. But these officials, both civilian and military, have repeatedly refused to provide any details about American planning for the postwar period.

"It might upset the Paris negotiations," a spokesman for the United States military command explained, "and it's just not in the national interest to have these things known."

A few Americans and some foreign diplomats here have expressed doubts about the wisdom of such a postwar policy.

It's like 1961 or 1965 all over again," said one Western official who has served several tours of duty in Indochina.

"The higher a company's profit, the higher the risk of a company's failure. Such contracts, the opposite of the usual low-bid contract,

they are proceeding as if the Vietnamese aren't even around. They're just bringing in Americans to do the job."

## Companies Were to Go

Until the events of the last month, the number of American civilian contract employees had been declining, falling from a high of more than 10,000 in 1970 to the present 5,000.

Many of the 125 American companies that held Defense Department contracts up through last month were scheduled to be phased out, knowledgeable sources say. Their contracts last month were worth just under \$100-million.

Although officials have refused to divulge anything about the new contracts, two companies that are reported to have received them are Lear Siegler, Inc., and NHA, Inc.

Lear Siegler, based in Santa Monica, Calif., is a diversified manufacturer that has had a number of contracts with the Air Force for aircraft and aerospace systems maintenance. NHA, Inc., with headquarters in Dallas, was incorporated in 1968 as Norman Harwell Associates, Inc. Its name was changed to NHA soon after incorporation, and it is now engaged in land development, engineering and planning technical data services, government contract maintenance and heavy construction.

Lear Siegler is said to have been given at least 300 new jobs servicing the 120 F-105 fighter planes that the United States rushed to South Vietnam earlier this month, and NHA is reported to have been awarded more than 200 other aircraft maintenance jobs for the South Vietnamese Air Force.

## Companies Are Silent

Both companies have been advertising in The Saigon Post, an English-language newspaper, for new workers over the last two weeks. But spokesmen for the companies said they were not free to comment on their newly awarded contracts.

"The Defense Department won't let us talk about our work, so I'm not going to tell you anything," said a man who described himself as the manager at Lear Siegler. He would not give his name.

According to some critical United States officials, the contractors are being given cost-plus contracts, which fix the companies' profits as a percentage of the total cost. Thus the higher a company's profit, the higher the risk of a company's failure. Such contracts, the opposite of the usual low-bid contract,

tend to lead contractors to bring in excess personnel, since the more workers they have, the higher their profit, these officials say.

## Problem of Control Seen

One problem that has apparently not been resolved is who will control these civilian contractors after the United States military command pulls out. Heretofore the United States Army Procurement Agency, under the military command, has been in charge of the contractors.

Embassy officials are known to think that the embassy, as the ranking civilian authority, should now exercise control. But there are indications that the Defense Department will try to keep its own control.

Last week, for example, a civilian dispatched by the Pentagon, Wilfred J. Curley, arrived in Saigon to take over the Army Procurement Agency from its military commander. Mr. Curley will reportedly convert the agency into a putative civilian organization.

The military command turned down all requests for an interview with Mr. Curley, on the ground that he was too busy "working out new contracts."

## A.I.D. to Stay on Job

In addition to the civilian contractors, there will also be about 1,000 members of the Agency for International Development, known here as USAID, and perhaps several hundred military attachés left in Vietnam after the peace accord is signed, knowledgeable sources say.

USAID has 997 American employees in South Vietnam today, down from a high of 2,700 four years ago.

The quasi-military agency in charge of the pacification program—known as CORDS for Civil Operations and Rural Development Support—will have to be phased out in its present form, since a majority of its 1,500 members are army personnel. But CORDS officials say they will probably preserve province advisory teams minus their army members.

The commissary, with its American food and liquor, will be kept open by turning it over to a civilian contractor, officials say. But the post exchange long the chief supplier of Vietnam's flourishing black market may have to go.

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# Rand Interviews Influenced Effort to Win Hearts and Minds

A four-year, \$15 million study of the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese, conducted for the U.S. government by the Rand Corp., greatly influenced the American effort to "win the hearts and minds" of the Vietnamese, according to officials involved in the program.

Transcripts of 2,371 interviews conducted between 1964 and 1968 have just been classified after names and dates that might identify those interviewed were removed.

The interviews, recorded on 62,765 pages, were the major part of an unprecedented effort to understand the motivations — the strengths and the weaknesses — of the enemy.

Brig. Gen. Robert Montague was an aide to Ambassador Robert C. Komer, the head of the American pacification effort, and is now a Pentagon manpower specialist. Montague said he and Komer and other officials of the Civil Operations and Rural Development Support organization were "intensely interested in the reports" as they came in.

The information from the interviews, describing how the Viet Cong operated, helped development of the controversial Phoenix program — the American and South Vietnamese effort to root out the Viet Cong infrastructure.

They were also influential, he said, in helping the South Vietnamese set up local governments, with local elections, to compete with the VC structure in the villages.

Barry Zorthian, who was minister counsel for information for the American operation in Vietnam during much of the period covered by the interviews, said they were regularly used by his office as the basis for briefings for news-

men and top U.S. officials on the operations of the VC.

However, the interviews apparently did not, by themselves, have a decisive impact on major American policy decisions or whether to continue bombing.

Zorthian said interviews conducted in 1968 with men who had recently come down from North Vietnam probably offered the "most definitive" evidence that North Vietnamese morale had been strengthened by the American bombing. But he said the interviews were part of several efforts which frequently gave contradictory answers on the effectiveness of the bombing in pushing the North Vietnamese toward a settlement.

Another series of interviews showed that the Vietnamese villages, caught between the two warring sides, feared and resented the spraying of herbicides by American and South Vietnamese planes.

But Montague said he and other officials were unable to reduce or stop the spraying. The interviews were conducted in 1966 but it was not until 1970 that the Nixon administration stopped most spraying — and then because of complaints from ecologists and pressure from other nations.

The interviews, which are available on microfilm from the National Technical Information Service in Springfield, Va., are accompanied by a readers' guide written by W. Phillips Davidson.

Most of the interviews were conducted by about 40 Vietnamese working under American direction. The interviewers had a variety of viewpoints, he said, ranging from strong anti-communism to strong sympathy for the goals of the VC.

"Probably the most serious source of bias is not in the interview reports themselves," Davidson said, "but in the mind of the user or analyst."

The interviews contain statements that will support almost any theory or political view regarding Vietnam. It is possible for hawks and doves to quote from them with equal facility."

Davidson said he was convinced the interviews offer essential facts about Vietnam that have been missed by both scholars and journalists.

"They tell the story of the people at the bottom of the pyramid — the people who brought in the harvests and bore the brunt of the fighting, the hard-working, hopeful, discouraged, terrified people — whose voices have all too seldom been heard," he said.



George C. Wilson

# The Vietnam Success

ROBERT W. KOMER—Mr. Pacification in the days of the Big War in Vietnam—wheeled out from behind the lectern to shout out his message to the military officers listening to his lecture at the Vietnam Training Center yesterday:

"The regional and popular forces in Vietnam captured most of the weapons, killed most of the enemy and in general did far more to change things in Vietnam than the United States troops and the ARVN troops put together. This sort of suggests what we should have done in the first place.

"But nobody is going to examine those statistics," Komer said—still shouting. "The press is too superficial to do so, and of course the military institution is not going to examine itself in this way."

The regional and popular forces he was praising once were the laughable militia of South Vietnam. The Americans nicknamed them the Ruff and Puffs. But Komer in his speech made an impressive case that the Ruff and Puff has at last made the Vietnamese farmer feel safe.

The regional and popular forces are the troops for pacification—a program in which Komer served as chief adviser in 1967 and 1968. The command structure for the pacification effort is known as CORDS for Civil Operations and Rural Development Support. It was Komer's own bureaucratic invention; one that he wound up running himself in Vietnam. The idea of CORDS was to put the resources of the Pentagon and State Department in one harness—without pushing

the Vietnamese local politicians out of the driver's seat.

In Komer's view, CORDS worked. With bitterness and sadness and anger he told the class of officers that CORDS is being undermined by the old line agencies—State, U.S. Agency for International Development and the Pentagon.

THE AMERICANS who administer CORDS are trained at the Vietnam Training Center. They learn the politics of the Vietnamese districts and provinces where they will serve as advisers, study the culture and master the language. Yet, as part of the cutback in personnel, one school will be closed before the year is out—another blow against CORDS.

Statistics figure in the plans to shut the center which has graduated 1,300 advisers. The U.S. advisory effort in Vietnam is down to about 1,500 Americans today, compared to a peak of about 6,500 in 1968-69.

ADMINISTRATORS of the Vietnam Training Center said that in the atmosphere of withdrawal, only the Defense Department seems to have any of the old enthusiasm for sending its best men to take the courses of up to 42 weeks.

Komer yesterday told the last class of district advisers to go through the school that "the favorite game of the U.S. bureaucracy in Washington and Saigon is, 'Get rid of CORDS.'

"This bastard organization that has no Washington percentage is now up for grabs. The old line agencies—

State, USAID (U.S. Agency for International Development), even the Pentagon, are trying to do it in because it committed the most heinous of bureaucratic sins: CORDS worked where they failed."

Komer's advocacy of CORDS can be discounted as the inventor talking about his prized invention but it is one program that started out and remained "Vietnamized."

If the whole Vietnam experience has demonstrated anything to this country, it is that the United States has limited power and patience for protracted warfare. The quick fix does not work. Rather, the mechanism which does work helps the people under attack fight their own battles—military, social and economic.

Thus, it would seem to be in the long term interest of the country to hold back on dismantling both CORDS, the demonstrably successful mechanism, and the school which supplies it with qualified advisers. At least until we see how the rest of "Vietnamization" works out.

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# U.S. Diplomats in Vietnam Said to Face Moral Issue

By BENJAMIN WELLES  
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 29—Assignments to Vietnam—particularly to the pacification programs there—have caused many young career diplomats to face a serious "moral dilemma," according to an article in the December issue of the Foreign Service Journal.

The critical question, the article says, is how far they should go in exposing incidents "which they knew to be wrong."

One Foreign Service officer, now back from Vietnam and on his way to another overseas assignment, is reported by the article to possess a file of "documented atrocities, including photographs."

"He has written extensive reports on these apparent war crimes he investigated in Vietnam," the article states. "As far as he knows, no action has ever been taken to punish the guilty," it says.

The article, which is entitled "Vietnamization of the Foreign Service," goes on to say that the owner of the file will not make his information public because he is a "supporter of the President's Vietnam policy and fears the effect on that policy of additional war crime controversy."

He is also "aware of the negative result disclosure would have on his career prospects," the article states.

## Press Reports Cited

State Department sources said that the alleged atrocities were investigated by the department and were also reported in the United States press on Jan. 12, 1970. They are said to have concerned the South Korean "Tiger" Division, one of two South Korean infantry divisions serving in Vietnam, and not United States forces.

A State Department spokesman said that "implications in the article that United States forces were involved or that there was a cover-up by the State Department are just plain inaccurate and misleading."

A Pentagon spokesman said that officers in its Southeast Asian section had not been able to obtain information of the Foreign Service Journal and thus could not comment.

"When we're given the facts," a Pentagon spokesman said, "we always look into atrocity charges."

The magazine article is signed with the name "John Claymore," a pseudonym, the journal explains, for a former diplomat who served in Vietnam and whose primary reason for subsequently resigning from the Foreign Service was "disagreement with United States policy on Southeast Asia."

Congressional and diplomatic sources have identified the author as John D. Marks, who served in the pacification program in Vietnam from 1966 to 1968 and later resigned to become a foreign policy consultant to Congress. Mr. Marks has confirmed his authorship.

The Foreign Service Journal has a circulation of approximately 10,000 copies throughout the executive branch and in Congress. It is published monthly by the American Foreign Service Association, a voluntary group comprising approximately 8,000 active and retired Foreign Service personnel.

The article notes that nearly 3 million Americans have now served in Vietnam, including career diplomats, or approximately 20 per cent of the Foreign Service.

Approximately 350 — the great majority of them junior officers—have been assigned to the pacification program, known as Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support, or CORDS. They have functioned as advisers to the South Vietnamese civilian and military administration — trying, the article says, to make the Government of South Vietnam "a viable force in the countryside."

## Generation Gap 'Sharpened'

Service in Vietnam, the article says, is a unique experience. In no other country have perhaps 20 per cent of the foreign service officers experimented with soft drugs, but "that is the case in Vietnam," it asserts.

"And in no other country," it adds, "do foreign service officers have their own personal automatic weapons and receive training in how to fire a grenade-launcher before they go."

The article says that the Vietnam experience has "sharpened the generation gap" between young and older diplomats. The younger officers, it says, often returned disillusioned with what they regard as deliberate suppression by senior officers of criticism either of the Vietnamese authorities or of the United States military.

The political section of the huge United States Embassy in Saigon is especially subject to criticism on these grounds, the article asserts.

"Almost all foreign service officers who served in the pacification programs and most junior members of the embassy staff itself give examples of how their reporting was distorted and suppressed in Saigon in order that the embassy might be consistent with the prevailing 'line' in dispatches to Washington," the writer declares.

## Combat Experience

"Statistics they knew to be merely worthless were constantly being quoted by the President of the United States as an indication that progress was being made in Vietnam," it says.

Other points made in the article included these:

While there was no clear State Department policy, most Foreign Service officers in the field were expected to bear arms. Many participated in combat operations and even called in air strikes or artillery fire on enemy positions;

The State Department decided during President Lyndon B. Johnson's second term that it must contribute 150 diplomats to the approximately 1,000 United States personnel—military as well as aid, intelligence and other civilians—in the CORDS program. Its policy of making duty in the pacification program mandatory for junior officers split the Foreign Service until it was scrapped last August. Now as the United States presence in Vietnam is reduced, only volunteers who have previously served in at least one other diplomatic post are being sent.

A few Foreign Service officers have resigned as a result of disagreement with the Vietnam war, but "they are definitely the exception and in each known case they have been very junior officers."

The article maintains that, despite the fact that Foreign Service per-

sonnel for Vietnam, "the majority enjoy the experience once they go."

Living conditions often are pleasant and, the article says, they find "the country and especially the women fascinating."

When these officers are assigned elsewhere, it states, "the return to a more traditional Foreign Service assignment is often a letdown."

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## U.S. AIDES ACCUSED ON VIETNAM VOTE

House Unit Hears 2 Charge  
Bids to Influence Election

By FELIX BRILANT

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 21

—Congressional investigators heard testimony today that United States officials in Saigon were seeking to influence next October's national election in favor of President Nguyen Van Thieu and that the balloting would be a "mockery" of the democratic process.

Two former employees of the Agency for International Development told a House Government Operations subcommittee that they had resigned because they believed United States personnel and facilities were being used improperly.

The witnesses, Theodore R. Jacquency and Richard S. Winslow Jr., identified the Central Intelligence Agency, the United States Information Agency and the American-financed Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS) program as the sources of funds, equipment and personnel that were contributing to the election effort.

The men denounced United States financing of the South Vietnamese police, intelligence and prison systems, which they said were being used by the Saigon Government to silence its political opposition and non-Communist advocates of peace and neutrality.

### 'More Feared, More Hated'

Mr. Jacquency, who said he recently completed an 18-month agency tour at Danang, told the panel that "no single entity, including the feared and hated Vietcong, is more feared or more hated than the South Vietnam secret police."

The men testified under oath, charging widespread corruption among high Vietnamese military and civilian officials "in all ministries." Mr. Jacquency also said that political persecution resulted in an estimated 20,000 to 100,000 political prisoners.

Mr. Jacquency told an A.I.D. contract costing 400,000 to build 288 new isolation cells at the prison on Con Son, which received wide publicity for its "tiger cages" a year ago. The witness said:

"Political prisoners are now being transferred from prisons on the mainland to Con Son island, apparently to make them less accessible during the election campaign. "In every province in Vietnam there is a province interrogation center with a reputation for using torture to interrogate people accused of Vietcong affiliations. They have a C.I.A. counterpart relationship, and in some case have a relationship with the A.I.D. police adviser."

### Describes Alleged Torture

Mr. Jacquency said that an old man—a friend of his—had been accused of Vietcong connections and had wanted to confess to avoid torture, "but was tortured horribly anyway, simply because it was standard operating procedure to torture prisoners."

He said that two American officials had told him that the old man had been given the "rock-and-roll" treatment in "large quantities of rice and water were forced down a prisoner's throat and then a smooth stone is rubbed over his belly producing days of intense pain and continual vomiting."

Before the two witnesses took the stand, John E. Reinhardt, assistant director of United States Information Agency, was cross-examined by the subcommittee chairman, William S. Moorhead of Pennsylvania, and by Representative Paul N. McCloskey Jr., Republican of California.

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# USIA Accused Of Aiding Thieu

By Tim O'Brien

Washington Post Staff Writer

Two members of a House subcommittee accused the U.S. Information Agency yesterday of aiding incumbents in Vietnam elections by supplying political poll results only to the South Vietnamese government, excluding challengers and potential challengers from access to the information.

Rep. William S. Moorhead, (D-Pa.), chairman of a Subcommittee on Foreign Operations and Government Information, said \$123 million has been spent on information services in South Vietnam, of which the United States has supplied 80 per cent.

"In my own personal view," he said, "what it boils down to is that we have helped the Saigon regime build a massive propaganda machine."

John E. Reinhardt, assistant USIA director for East Asia, admitted that the agency's poll results are classified for official use only, for one year. He said that although the polls could be of limited value to incumbent candidates, they are not taken for partisan political purposes.

Reinhardt also said the USIA has issued orders that its facilities and personnel may not be used to influence the outcome of forthcoming Vietnam elections. The polling itself, he said, was stopped in February.

Rep. Paul McCloskey (R-Calif.) said giving poll results to government officials and withhold them from challengers is "a political boon to the government in power."

Moorhead termed the expenditure of U.S. funds for polling "a waste and possible misapplication of money."

The subcommittee also heard testimony from two former AID officials in Vietnam who resigned because of alleged misuse of AID polls. Theodore Jacquency, who now heads a new group that seeks "fair elections" in South Vietnam, said he resigned "because I felt that U.S. policy in Vietnam supported President Thieu's regime."

Jacquency singled out an attitude survey conducted by

CORDS, a pacification and development program administered by AID in South Vietnam. He said results of the poll—which quizzed Vietnamese on such subjects as government leadership and candidate preferences—"were for the eyes of Thieu supporters only."

In addition to the polls, Jacquency said, the U.S.I.A. and Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office lent vast "political propaganda services" to the Saigon government, "at a time when that government is denying freedom of the press to many Vietnamese nationalists."

Jacquency charged that "despite declarations of U.S. impartiality, U.S. resources have been diverted to assist President Thieu's campaign."

He recommended a full congressional investigation of U.S. involvement in South Vietnam elections along with an inquiry into the Thieu regime's policy with respect to the right of others to "disseminate their views freely."

Meanwhile, Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.) introduced legislation to "once and for all put an end" to what he said was U.S. financing of mercenary forces from Thailand fighting in Laos.

On June 7 the State Department admitted that the United States was supporting Thai forces in Laos but described them as volunteers.

Symington's amendment would ban the use of American funds to support any member of a local military force in Laos who is not a citizen or national of Laos. He claimed the Nixon administration has found a loophole in legislation adopted by Congress last year which was designed to prevent U.S. backing for Thai operations in Laos.

The legislation barred the use of Defense Department funds, but Symington charged that the administration avoided this stricture by using money available to the CIA.

The Senate Rules Committee approved a special \$100,000 study of the origins of the Vietnam war.

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the Senate to restore the full appropriation for a program which was designed to grow with its intended \$25 million authorization in 1959 rather than be emasculated with a \$7.5 million administration budget request in for fiscal 1972. All of the people employed as foster grandparents are from the poverty level income bracket, and as such, can qualify for old age assistance. It seems senseless to deprive older Americans a meaningful service to our society and to force them to go on welfare assistance for approximately the same amount of money they could productively earn as a foster grandparent. The seniors lose the opportunity to engage in worthwhile employment; they are forced to take welfare from society rather than to contribute an invaluable and personal service to that society and its neglected children. Our Nation and our communities lose the benefit of their service to the children for whom they are foster grandparents.

This program ought to be expanded rather than cut back. There are 68 foster grandparent programs in the United States and Puerto Rico, employing 4,093 persons. This number appears insignificant when compared to the more than 8 million people over 60 years of age who live in poverty, or 40 percent of their total. If only 1 percent of the 8 million were able to participate, 80,000 seniors would find themselves in positions of self-respect and removed from the Nation's dole. Howard Parks, program director of the Stockton, Calif., foster grandparents program, reports that the number of employment applications in the Stockton files are equivalent to 3 percent of local senior citizens who are receiving public assistance payments; these applications to join the foster grandparents program serving the Northern California Youth Center were all received without solicitation by the Stockton office. The Stockton program is unique in this country in its personal involvement of the foster grandparents with juvenile delinquents from the Northern California Youth Center and it has been lauded around the Nation for its great success in benefitting both the young men and the seniors in their need for meaningful human relationships.

I am concerned about the direction which the White House Conference on Aging will take when it meets in November of this year. The advice of older people and particularly of organizations most closely identified with their problems must be sought by those planning the Conference on Aging. It is the fear of many senior citizen spokesmen that wisdom of the needs, desires, and hopes of older people is being sought, instead from specialists and providers of services.

The elderly are not just another American minority crying out for fair treatment and recognition of their needs. They are the least recognized because their form and manner of protest and appeal is most easily ignored. They have been quietly and nonviolently asking their children for the ability to live out their lives in an honorable, healthy, and decent way. With a trillion dollar gross

national product, our affluent nation has seen fit to contribute only a total of \$23 million for special service programs for the elderly in a year when DOD cost overruns for research and development of weaponry systems total \$33 billion. The administration failed to support a national program of federally funded community service training and employment which would have been provided under the vetoed Manpower Training Act. In their plans for executive reorganization, the Administration on Aging would be stripped of its primary function of administering the senior citizens programs with the RSVP—retired senior volunteer program—and foster grandparent program to be engulfed by the huge new Federal volunteer agency and the research and development and demonstration programs to be transferred to the Social Rehabilitation Service. I believe that as a Nation that prides itself in the advancement of human dignity, we cannot allow our senior citizens to die the slow death of poverty, ill health, uselessness, and loneliness.

#### GAO STUDY OF VIETNAM PACIFICATION PROGRAM SPENDING AND THE PENTAGON REPLY

Mr. PERCY, Mr. President, in 1970 auditors of the General Accounting Office stationed in Vietnam studied the pacification program operated jointly by the United States and the Government of South Vietnam—the program known as CORDS—Civil Operations and Rural Development Support. On July 1, 1971, GAO referred its study to the Secretary of Defense and appropriate House and Senate Committee Chairmen, and on July 10 the New York Times reported one of the findings of the study—that of \$2,077.6 million authorized for expenditures in 3 fiscal years, GAO could not find documentation obligating the spending of \$1.7 billion.

The GAO study was provided by the Comptroller General to the Government Operations Committee of which I am acting ranking Republican member, and to the Chairmen of the House Foreign Affairs, the Senate Foreign Relations, and the Senate and House Armed Services Committees. It is an extremely valuable document. Titled "Background Information on United States Participation in Pacification and Development Programs in Vietnam," it raises very serious questions about the uses and controls on hundreds of millions of U.S. funds spent for pacification programs, and on the effectiveness of the programs themselves. The study deserves full disclosure and Congressional action, to assure at the very minimum, immediate use of proper accounting and auditing procedures.

As a result of the Times report I called for congressional study of the document, and yesterday, after reviewing the GAO study, I wrote Secretary Laird requesting that the study be declassified and be made public.

The Defense Department made available to the press yesterday a document responding to the July 10 Times report. This document asserts that the \$1.7

billion can be fully accounted for by obligatory data not available in Vietnam. It said that about \$1.3 billion was budgeted for hardware and other commodities and that this amount can be completely accounted for because it was supplied to units in Vietnam through the logistical systems of the U.S. armed services. The Defense Department may be correct in asserting that it can support with records the disposition of the goods costing \$1.3 billion. But this does not address my point, or the point being made by GAO.

The CORDS is a central, joint command that oversees the operations of eight pacification programs operating throughout Vietnam. Logically, CORDS should have a complete accounting of the amounts of funds being spent for each program. The GAO says that neither CORDS nor the Military Assistance Command Vietnam—MACV—in Saigon has such an accounting. That is because much of the goods used in pacification programs flow directly from supply depots and logistics centers in each of the three armed services directly to field units in Vietnam. CORDS has no way of knowing about the uses of these materials as the system currently operates. As the GAO study indicated, in an unclassified paragraph:

During our survey, we received incorrect and conflicting figures from the CORDS directorates. We also found that many of the responsible officials in the directorates were unaware of the amounts obligated under their programs, and in some instances did not know the amounts in their budgets.

There is a reason too for the current method of operation. In 1967, when the CORDS program was set up, combat was at its highest point. It would have been too time consuming to demand strict accountability of field commanders for all materials requisitioned. The open-ended supply system established then still exists now, although combat has been sharply reduced.

I suggest that it is now time to impose a more logical system on the dispersal of U.S. funds and materials for pacification programs in Vietnam. The Defense Department paper does not reassure me that the system now operates adequately; it is not responsive to the GAO staff study. Because we are dealing with hundreds of millions of dollars, I think we have a right to insist on a much more thorough investigation of this problem.

Without violating the secret classification affixed to the GAO study by the Defense Department, I will try to summarize briefly the nature of the CORDS pacification programs and the GAO's findings on the funding and effectiveness of these programs.

The CORDS program was begun in 1967 after the United States convinced the Government of South Vietnam that a pacification program would be useful. The CORDS effort has been implemented through eight specific programs for territorial security, people's self-defense forces, establishment of local governments, economic prosperity, national unity, protection from terrorism—Phoenix—public information, and refugees. CORDS itself can be described as

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## Pentagon Accounts For Vietnam Funds Reported Missing

By DANA ADAMS SCHMIDT  
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 13—The Defense Department explained today what had happened to \$1.7-billion in United States support for the Government of South Vietnam that an audit by the General Accounting Office had not been able to trace.

The office's findings were contained in a 160-page survey entitled, "Background Information on United States Participation in Pacification and Development Programs in Vietnam."

The text of the report has not been made public, but a report of the conclusions was published in The New York Times Saturday.

The funds, the Pentagon said in a four-page statement today were not missing at all; the books accounting for it were merely not kept in South Vietnam, where the study was conducted.

The survey said that \$2.1-billion had been authorized for the

1968, 1969 and 1970 fiscal years, but that it had been able to find accounts covering specific obligations for only \$339.2-million of this sum.

"The largest part of the \$1.7-billion, for example, about \$1.3-billion," the Pentagon said, "was budgeted to provide military hardware and other commodities to the regional and popular forces under the Military Assistance Service-Funded Program."

It said that this fact had been recognized in the survey.

The bookkeeping for this military aid, the department said, is handled through the South Vietnamese Army, Navy or Air Force, which receive supplies from the United States and pass them on to the regional and popular forces.

This part of the aid program is split up among the three armed services, the department said, but is finally recorded in the United States, where it is audited as part of military aid to South Vietnam.

The department said no separate audit of American aid to the popular forces was kept. Aid to these forces shows in the records of American aid to the South Vietnamese armed forces and is audited in Washington, as all other aid figures are audited, it said.

During the last few years,

the department continued, the Deputy Controller for Internal Audit in the Office of the Secretary of Defense has regularly audited military aid to South Vietnam, sometimes in conjunction with the auditory services of the United States Army, Navy and Air Force.

The Defense Department noted that \$400-million of the unaccounted \$1.7-billion "is for services and personnel costs and is also funded separately."

"In summary," the department concluded, "obligational records are maintained outside of Vietnam and are periodically audited. Within Vietnam the matériel records are audited continuously for validity of re-

quirements and distribution to users. Validity of inventory records at the Vietnamese armed forces depot level is verified during these audits."

The Defense Department said the General Accounting Office, a Congressional watchdog agency, had advised the Secretary of Defense, Melvin R. Laird, that the document should not be regarded as a regular report. Furthermore, it has not been subject to the reviews usually applied to reports, nor submitted to be agencies concerned for comment, the Pentagon said.

It had been intended, the department said, for use in planning and as preparation for later reviews of aid programs.

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THE OVER THE HILL

\$1.7 BILLION AID FUND

## 'Loss' No More Oversight To Average U.S. Taxpayer

AS HARD AS MOST AMERICANS have to struggle these days to pay their federal income taxes, common sense would certainly seem to dictate that Congress and the federal bookkeeping establishment ought to know, or at least be able to find out, what happens to the peoples' tax contributions when they get spent.

Thus, it came as a real shocker to learn last week that the General Accounting Office, which happens to be the watchdog spending agency for the Congress, hasn't been able to find out what happened to \$1.7 billion of a \$2.1 billion appropriation authorized by the Congress to be spent or committed for the South Vietnam pacification program.

After months of study and searching around for information, the GAO was forced to report that it could account for only \$369.2 million of the \$2.1 billion authorized by Congress to be spent on this particular program during the fiscal years of 1963, 1969 and 1970.

What happened to the rest of the money remains a mystery as far as the government auditors are concerned. Whether it was spent without proper record being kept, whether it was frittered away, or whether it was simply stolen or embezzled will probably never be known.

The money was supposed to be handled by an agency called Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support or CORDS for short.

THE \$2.1 BILLION HANDLED OVER to this agency came principally from funds appropriated for the Defense Department but a portion also came from the Central Intelligence Agency and the Agency for International Development.

In trying to trace what happened to all this money the GAO even sent auditors to Vietnam. They found that even though there were 12 different auditing groups within the internal structure of CORDS, only two of these groups had made any audit reviews between the time the agency was established in 1963 and 1970.

Out of the \$369.2 million spent or obligated, and for which records could be found, the auditors reported that \$65.5 million of this "was not used in CORDS and was subsequently used by the contributing agencies for other purposes." What those other purposes were the auditors said they were unable to determine.

Since the auditors couldn't find where this \$65.5 million was expended, this means that out of the \$2.1 billion authorized only about \$370 million in expenditures could be traced through proper records being kept.

One of the projects CORDS administered was what was termed a "village self-help" program. While the auditors reported that from a political standpoint this program "has experienced a degree of success," they also said that one of the problems encountered in administering this program was "misappropriation of funds."

THE AUDITORS ALSO SAID they found that many of the responsible officials in the CORDS organization were unaware of the amounts obligated under their programs and in some instances did not know the amounts in their budgets.

Even assuming that most of the funds turned over to CORDS was spent for authorized purposes and wasn't misappropriated or embezzled, this whole operation represents an almost unbelievable example of the loose, shoddy and wasteful manner we have been blowing money away in Vietnam all these years.

This past Sunday we noted that since we got ourselves mixed in Vietnam we have spent over \$100 billion on the war and its associated other costs. That adds up to about \$300 for every American, and when one thinks what this same amount of money could have accomplished in our own country compared to what it has accomplished over there, it becomes more understandable why so many Americans are as fed up with our Vietnam misadventure as they are today.

It is too late now to cry over milk that has already been spilled. Yet, if nothing else comes from this GAO report of the untraceable \$1.7 billion spent in Vietnam by this one government agency, it should at least force the Congress to tighten the screws on future appropriations and demand some proper record keeping on the part of government officials handed the responsibility of spending our taxpayers' money.

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## \$1.7-Billion of War Funds Unaccounted For in Audit

### Congressional Agency Unable to Learn How Most of \$2.1-Billion Authorized for Pacification in 1970 Was Used

By TAD SZULC

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 9—The General Accounting Office, the Congressional watchdog agency, has reported that it is unable to determine how \$1.7-billion of \$2.1-billion authorized for the pacification program in South Vietnam was spent or committed during the three-year period ended July 30, 1970.

The office made its report in a 160-page survey entitled "Background Information on United States Participation in Pacification and Development Programs in Vietnam," sent to Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird and several Congressional committees on July 1.

The General Accounting Office auditors, who made their survey in Vietnam, said that the specific obligations of the pacification program that they were able to find accounted for only \$339.2-million of the total of \$2.1-billion authorized for the fiscal years 1968, 1969 and 1970.

And, they said, \$65.5-million of the \$339.2-million had been spent for purposes that they had not been able to determine, which was taken to mean that the money was spent for projects other than those for which it had originally been designated.

The United States agency responsible for the over-all pacification in Vietnam is called Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support, or CORDS. Its responsibilities include the care of refugees and other war victims. Operation Phoenix, which is designed to eliminate the Vietcong sub-

versive apparatus, also comes under the agency.

The funds for CORDS come principally from the Defense Department although the Central Intelligence Agency and the Agency for International Development contribute to them.

The accounting office survey said that the \$65.5-million of the \$339.2-million of the obligated money "was not used in CORDS and was subsequently used by the contributing agencies for other purposes."

It said it could "not determine" what these purposes were.

In fiscal language, obligations are the commitment or actual expenditure of authorized funds.

The survey has offered no conclusions as to the discrepancy between the funds authorized for CORDS and those actually obligated.

But in the section on "village self-help" programs, one of the CORDS operations, the document listed "misappropriation of funds" among the problems facing the agency. The report said, however, that from a political viewpoint the village program "has experienced a degree of success."

The survey said that "we have learned that internal audits and inspection had generally not been conducted" by CORDS.

It noted that while there are 12 "auditing groups within the executive branch for CORDS review," only two of them "had performed reviews" since the formation of CORDS in 1968.

"We also found that many of the responsible officials in the directorates were unaware of amounts obligated under their programs and in some instances did not know the amounts in their budgets," the survey said of the Saigon agency.

The survey added that "in the three fiscal years ending on June 30, 1970, CORDS received \$1.7-billion."

"We obtained obligations about \$339.2-million," it reported.

But the accounting office said that "we were unable to obtain obligations for \$1.7-billion of the \$2.1-billion."

It reported that the Defense Department had contributed 86 per cent of this total. The Central Intelligence Agency provided 5 per cent and the Agency for International Development 9 per cent. The C. I. A., however, has refunded some of the

money spent by A. I. D. on its behalf on unspecified covert projects.

The accounting office said that the bulk of the CORDS authorization was budgeted for "hardware" and military and auxiliary equipment for South Vietnamese military organizations.

Under Operation Phoenix, CORDS is increasing the South Vietnamese national police from 100,000 to 120,000 men this year.

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